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Abstract:  
While Globalisation in the agri- food sector may provide opportunities for companies in 
developing countries to access international markets, it also threatens the existence of some sub-
sectors. This paper reviews existing literature on co-ordination and international standards, 
identifying the importance of both to supply chain management. In the context of the Brazilian 
beef export chain, this paper contributes to the question of how exporters are changing their 
transaction practices in order to respond efficiently to those standards. In-depth interviews with 
key people and summaries of case study findings highlight the impact of international standards 
on the organisation of the export supply chain. It is highlighted that to be globally competitive, 
traditional mistrust and opportunism need to be overcome by the formation of network or quasi 
integration strategies between processors and suppliers. Prediction shows that sharing market 
information would lead to a supply chain management and could be considered  trading-up. 
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1.INTRODUCTION 
Standards are developed to signal quality, to respond to consumer’s concern or to demonstrate 
compliance with a specific regulation. The establishment of standards may aid product 
differentiation providing access to niche market or assure safety. However, while standards may 
aim to provide greater transparency in the chain, conflicts of interest exist. For instance, 
participants may be seeking to appropriate added value of the product, if able to do so. It is 
fundamental to identify, in a chain analysis, the “co-ordinator” of the chain and how his power 
affects both the information and the material flows. Market information is considered a tool, 
which supports the setting of standards, and knowledge can be held to increase market power. 
However, the exercise of power does not have to be perceived as harmful. An example is a 
relationship where retailers, wanting to be recognised as prestigious, will teach manufacturers to 
produce better products. The learning achieved can aid to an internationally competitive 
company. 
This paper aims to further the understanding of how the adoption of standards is impacting on 
established transaction practices used by the Brazilian beef export chain. In addition, it proposes 
changes in the co-ordination forms to respond more efficiently to the Globalisation process. 
Understanding changes in transactions due to standard setting has implication not only for the 
Brazilian Beef chain, but also to other supply chains coping with demanding markets. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 establishes the problem under analysis; Section 3 
presents a theoretical background and data about the Brazilian beef chain; Section 4 details the 
method used; Section 5 summarises the results of four case studies and interviews carried out in 
the period 2001-2002 and, finally, Section 6 draws some conclusions and suggests further 
research. 
2.STUDY PROBLEM 
Until 1990 Brazil pursued a highly protectionist trade policy based on a complex system of non-
tariff barriers and export incentive schemes which, combined with fiscal incentives and 
subsidies, resulted in a high degree of protection for specific sectors. The process of economic 
liberalisation, initiated in 1990, has produced significant changes in Brazil's foreign trade, 
resulting in a more competitive economy. This process was accelerated with “Real Plan” in 
1994. Most markets can now be characterised by competition, participation of foreign firms 
through imports, local production and joint ventures between national and international 
companies. After more than ten years of liberalisation, deregulation and monetary stabilisation, 
food products are the only surplus in Brazilian external trade. However, products in which Brazil 
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has high competitiveness (such as sugar, poultry, coffee, beef and orange juice) have been 
finding strong barriers to the international market. 
Brazil is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and therefore has made 
commitments to subscribe to the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement, World 
Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and to the underlying Codex Alimentarius (CODEX) 
principles.  The country is also part of the Mercosur (South American Economic Block) along 
with Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. These countries implemented a common external tariff 
on the 1st January 1995. However, internal adjustments regarding regulation have been imposed 
to the economies of the country-members. But, so far, there has been no harmonisation in the 
SPS standards among Mercosur’s members. Some sub-sectors, such as dairy and beef, have been 
negotiating to harmonise their SPS, but this initiative has been taken mainly by the private 
sector. 
Vogel [1] states that as a consequence of international trade developing countries are adopting 
the high standards of their important trading partners. Consumers willing to pay more for higher 
standards demand companies working with lower standards to upgrade. In turn, as domestic 
companies have to comply with international standards, consumers in exporting countries will 
also benefit from stricter standards of importing countries. However, sometimes, these standards 
can be too high for consumers of developing countries. Nevertheless, these stricter standards will 
influence regulations and rules for domestic producers as well. This whole process is called 
trading up by Vogel [1] and Donovan et al. [2] and can be one of the benefits brought by 
Globalisation. However, Donovan et al. [2] also identify an opposite process: trading down, 
where developed countries lower their standards to compete with cheaper products produced 
under weaker standards. From this discussion, the broad question arises is that, if developing 
countries are becoming part of a concentrated and global supply chain, what are the 
consequences for their companies? Are they receiving any advantages from the compliance to 
international standards? The specific question that this paper contributes to answer is, how 
Brazilian beef exporters are changing their transaction practices to respond efficiently to these 
standards? In the context of the Brazilian beef export chain, this paper contributes to the question 
of how exporters are changing their transaction practices in order to respond efficiently to those 
standards. 
 
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
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Beef export is characterised by commodities, tight margins and non-tariff barriers, (scientifically 
supported or not) raised by developed countries. Low cost used to be the main competitive 
advantage. Today, however, some consumer markets, such as the European Union, demand 
differentiated products with higher margins and full compliance to both process and product 
standards due fears over e.g. food safety concerns. These requirements try to guarantee food 
safety but they can also function as non-tariff barriers. In other words, beef processors must 
respond not only to Brazilian regulations or domestic consumers, but also to a more demanding 
international consumer.  
The supply chain has been described as a sequence of transactions arranged by market or formal 
mechanisms (contracts), based on ideas from Coase [3] and Williamson [4] [5]. The core is the 
dichotomy between co-ordination of production activity through market (made up of isolated 
small firms communicating through price signals) and hierarchy (exemplified by the large, 
vertically integrated corporation). Co-ordination allows the firm to receive, to process, to diffuse 
and to use information to elaborate competitive strategies, reacting to changes and taking 
advantage of opportunities. In addition there are real transactions occurring at intermediary 
points along this continuum (market- hierarchy) embodied in different forms of co-operation. 
The organisational forms between market and hierarchy are known as co-operation agreements. 
Those strategies have increasingly been used and stud ied because they tend to result in greater 
flexibility to new situations than vertical integration. This study uses the classification developed 
by Humphrey and Schmitz [6] to characterise the different forms of chain co-ordination: 
 
    Table 1 - The Characteristics of the Chain Co-ordination 
Chain Co-ordination Characteristics 
Spot market  Both links do not collaborate over 
production system, which is 
considered standard. Risks to the 
buyer are low due to the ability of the 
supplier. 
Network Co-operation between two firms in the 
same level of power, size and/or 
technology.  
Quasi- integration Buyer defines the product and controls 
its production. Buyer invests on 
suppliers to reduce risk of failures. 
Vertical Integration Buyer takes direct ownership of 
operations. 
Source: Adapted from Humphrey and Schmitz (2000). 
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Information plays a valuable role to the supply chain co-ordination and, consequently, 
competitiveness. Spot markets usually are based on price information. For example, Casson [7] 
emphasizes the influence of collecting information and communicating it to firms, corresponding 
to different links in the chain. For example, raw material supplier’s price, processor’s price, 
wholesaler’s price and retailer’s price. However, when under conditions of uncertainty or 
differentiation of goods, price alone cannot transfer all relevant information to the whole chain in 
such a way to allow it to allocate resources efficiently. Other forms such as networks or quasi-
integrations are prescribed due to the enabling of partners to share information. There are 
basically two kinds of information along the chain: the market information and technical 
information. The importance of making a distinction of both kinds of information, technical and 
market, is due to the difference in the way each one is available. An entrepreneur can obtain 
market information depending on the nature of the prevailing economic organisation (for 
example, the degree of concentration) while his access to technical information does not. 
 
3.1 International Standards for beef export 
 
Compliance to food standards is a qualifier factor to international trade. Farina and Reardon [8] 
state that standards (along with grades) can be outcomes (product characteristics) or 
manufacturing processes related to quality, safety, authenticity and “goodness of the production 
process”. Product characteristics include pathogens, toxins, hormones, food additives, and fat 
content, among others, while a process standard may involve animal welfare, traceability, feed, 
growth enhancers and biotechnology. Another study, focusing on Brazilian case studies by 
Reardon and Farina [9] concludes that private standards can become public when enforced by 
the government. Generally, private standards are imposed by transnational companies and 
“become” the rule of the market. When standards exclude companies or nations from the 
international trade, they can be considered non-tariff barriers on agricultural products and mainly 
affect developing countries, the late movers in the Globalisation process.  
World beef production was estimated at 47 million tonnes with the United States of America 
being responsible for about 25% of this followed by Brazil, which produced 6,4 millions tonnes 
in 2000. However, Brazil exported less than 8% of its production in 2000, 315 thousand tons, of 
which 60% was fresh, chilled or frozen and 40% processed beef. Brazil has no access to the most 
important fresh beef markets (the US and Japan) due to food safety problems. Nevertheless, the 
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country has been increasing its export, which was valued at more than US$ 1 billion in 2001 and 
2002. 
In order for Brazil to maintain an increasing export market, it is important to understand the 
impact of beef safety information on beef consumption. Flake and Patterson [10], comparing 
estimated elasticities, suggest that beef producers should maintain efforts in modifying their 
product with regard to both safety and health attributes. The more information a consumer has, 
the more concerned he/she is. The same authors affirm that the US and the EU consumer are 
shifting away from beef because of concerns over human health (such as cholesterol) and 
potential illnesses attributable to Escherichia coli, salmonellas and BSE (Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy). 
Furthermore, food safety issues may lead to changes in the traditional forms of transactions. 
According to Loader and Hobbs [11] food safety concerns creates an information asymmetry 
between all the buyers and sellers involved in the supply chain, meaning one agent in the 
transaction knows more than the other. This asymmetry of information alters the power relations 
during the transaction, where the seller usually knows more about the true quality of the product 
than the buyer. However, buyers have been developing mechanisms to obtain this information. 
Loader and Hobbs point out two kinds of response to this problem. The first is a private one, the 
firm-level response, meaning a certification or label to guarantee safety and quality. The second 
is a public response through legislation regulating the labelling and pathogen-reduction 
standards. Both responses (public and private) aim to guarantee true information keep the buyer 
and final consumer about the origin of the beef, how it was produced and whether it is free from 
diseases.  
From the above discussion it is shown that a supply chain can be co-ordinated in different ways 
(market, hierarchy, network or quasi- integration) and different kinds of information (technical 
and market) flow in both directions of the chain. Another important point raised is that food 
standards can enhance (opening new markets) or reduce (eliminating companies) the supply 
chain competitiveness.  
4. BEEF CHAIN 
The paradox of the Brazilian beef chain, supplying two completely different markets (export-
supermarkets and local retailers) is emphasized in a previous study where Silva and Batalha [12] 
split the beef chain into two sub-systems showing the impossibility of studying the beef sub-
sector in a uniform way due to its heterogeneity. The Brazilian beef chain is represented by the 
figure below: 
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Figure 1: Two sub-systems in the Brazilian Beef Sector 
Source: Silva and Batalha [12]. 
 
It can be broadly stated that system A covers requirements for urban towns (quality and price) or 
capable of supplying the international market as well. System B has little pressure to upgrade 
and just serves local markets, where price rather than quality is the driving force for purchase. 
However, analysing the division made by this previous study [12], Zylbersztajn and Machado 
Filho [13] find that differentiating the heterogeneity of the Brazilian chain through technical 
standards alone is a reductionism. The authors affirm that both systems can be considered 
efficient. System B is organised to supply low income and geographically dispersed consumers 
with few or no demands for quality. These consumers are essentially price-driven. On the other 
hand, consumers supplied by system A are quality-driven. As a result of this feature, System A is 
organised to supply local and international markets covering international standards. According 
to these authors, the co-ordination of these chains supplying quality driven consumers tend to be 
through network or quasi- integration forms. The reason is to facilitate the information flow and 
assure food safety along beef processing. 
Traditionally, a lack of trust between producers and processors in Brazil is common. Such bad 
relationships lead to the instability in the supply of cattle; no reward for quality or for physical 
distance between producer and processor and payment is given for dead weight and paid at least 
30 days after the meat is received. 
 
5. METHOD 
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As market concentration increases and sub-sectors become smaller in number in the agricultural 
sector, according to Sterns et al. [14], more case studies seems relevant to the development of 
agribusiness theory. Thus, this study adopts a qualitative approach to describe Brazilian beef 
supply chains, answering how these chains are organised. The focus is on the link in the middle 
of the supply chain (in this case, the beef processor) and the two sets of transactions downwards 
and upwards (T1 and T2). 
The first step was to identify participants in the industry and the existent vertical or horizontal 
relationships. This was achieved through 19 interviews with key-persons and secondary data  
building a profile of the industry structure. 76 interviews were carried out, however, in this 
paper, only four case studies are presented, using documentation, focused interviews and direct 
observation (site visits). The link in the middle of the chain (beef processor/exporter) and its 
direct supplier were interviewed. Documentation included secondary data (such as theses, 
dissertations, journals, newspapers and technical magazines) and promotional brochures 
provided by the companies visited. When available, production costs and annual reports were 
also analysed.  
Semi-structured interviews were carried out and took around two hours. The sessions focused 
particularly on the following issues: activities carried out by the company; interactions with other 
links (suppliers, customers) and to what degree; inputs and outputs features; how information is 
obtained; how prices are determined and problems perceived in the supply chain. These 
questions clarified the transaction features, levels of trust and power within each chain. The 
standards required were also discussed and their impacts on links and the whole chain. The 
following figure shows the issues underlying the data collection and analysis. 
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Figure 2: Research Construct 
 
Findings can be analytically (or “theoretically”) generalised as suggested by Yin [15]. Despite 
their influence, other important links (such as input industry and wholesalers) of the supply chain 
are not covered in this study, as it deliberately focuses on the farmer -processor interface. 
 
5. 1 STEP 1: Key Person Interviews and Secondary Data 
 
Focusing on the processing link, this section presents results about the chain structure. Beef 
exporters have little flexibility for new activities due to high asset specificity (such as the 
processing plant, human resources training and food safety requirements). While the farmer can 
maintain livestock grazing, the processor has a higher risk of not selling due to the perishability 
of the beef. Farmers, due to the extensive production system adopted, have little difference on 
costs maintaining the cattle on the field for longer than planned. 
Approximately 60% of Brazilian beef exports result from five nationally owned beef processors, 
a highly concentrated group organised as such to increase power in overseas transactions. These 
companies are extremely competitive, producing on a large scale and, recently, specialising in 
some products exported such as forequarter cuts and organic beef. Through the Ministry of 
Agriculture, and private company financial support, since 2001, an important horizontal co-
operation has been promoting the Brazilian beef brand on the international market.  Beef 
exporters have also invested in compliance with food safety standards through the 
implementation of HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points). Usually, HACCP 
consists of an internal team identifying critical control points throughout the process. Critical 
points in beef processing generally cover areas such as receiving raw materials, packaging 
materials, cleaning chemicals, process equipment, and the temperature of products during 
processing, chilling and freezing temperature controls. Investments in microbiological testing 
were also done. The beef processor must prove that control schemes are efficient and applied 
daily. HACCP may initially increase costs to beef processors, especially in an industry with low 
margins like beef processing. Still, the manager perceives it makes labour more aware of waste. 
Another important point raised during the interviews is that the compliance of HACCP removes 
from the market those small and medium companies that cannot produce large volumes and 
obtain scale economies. 
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Following the path identified by Reardon and Farina [9], private standards adopted by exporters 
are today part of the regulations of the Brazilian Ministry of Agricultural and Food Supply. 
These regulations are pushing for improvements in the whole chain, especially for beef 
processors that are not able to export. New legislation (for example, Portaria 130 e 145) requires 
improvements in terms of sanitary, technological and hygiene standards in the commercialisation 
and distribution of meat. Besides protecting the consumer's health, these regulations are 
reorganising the supply chain. Another Brazilian regulation (Portaria 046) states that Beef 
processors should apply HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points) to guarantee 
food safety. This international standard has been extended to the national regulation with only 
partial compliance until now.  
A key mover in the Brazilian beef export increase was the creation of external agents to manage 
information flow (technical and market) and international advertising. There are two important 
associations, Abiec and Sicadergs (Sindicato da Industria da carne do Rio Grande do Sul), 
playing this role. Both created a common brand for a group of beef processors, Brazilian beef 
and South Brazilian Beef. 
This initiative is an attempt to develop effective horizontal partnerships changing managers’ 
opportunistic behaviour. Usually competitors, beef processors are having some adaptation 
difficulties in joining strengths, mainly when they have to share information. Awkwardly, 
processors are more effective developing horizontal partnerships than vertical ones. A probable 
reason is the homogeneity of this concentrated group as mentioned above. The horizontal 
partnerships can be considered a survival strategy used to increase bargaining power regarding 
even more concentrated links (national supermarkets chains and importers). One example is a 
joint venture that started in 2000 between Bertin (the largest beef exporters) and Friboi (the 
second largest beef exporter) and called BF (initial of the two company’s name). BF is a plant 
processing with the capacity to slaughter and bone 800 head of cattle per day and employing 800 
employees.  
Regulations for traceability along the supply chain come previously from the EU directives 
1760/2000 (17/07/2000) and 1825/2000 (25/08/2000). These directives establish a system for the 
identification and registration of bovine animals and regard the labelling of beef and beef 
products. Aiming to support and regulate this process, the Office of Agricultural Protection 
(SDA) from the Brazilian Ministry of Agricultural and Food Supply implemented the Normative 
Instruction 1/2002 from 09/01/2002, which creates the Brazilian System of Identification and 
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Certification of Bovine Origin, known simply as traceability. Summarising, this instruction states 
that an identification system to register bovines should be established and consisted on: 
· Individual identification of the animal  
· Creation of a Data base 
· Animal passport (including animal movement) 
· Individual registration of the animal to be maintain on fa rms and slaughterhouses. 
In sum, other important agents, private and public institutions, and both internal and external to 
the supply chain, are co-ordinating efforts for the compliance of the food standards. In the next 
section, four case studies findings are presented to show the impact of the compliance within 
selected chains. 
 
5.2 STEP 2:Case Studies 
5.2.1. Case Study A  
Case A is a family business and the largest Brazilian beef exporter selling 45% of its production 
to North America, Chile, Far East, the European Union and Middle East. It has five processing 
plants with total slaughter capacity of 5 100 cattle heads per day. Case A chose a backward 
vertical integration as a way of co-ordinate its chain, owning seven farms, where the traditional 
production system has been adopted (nursing, raising and fattening). On its seven farms, it 
breeds livestock to protect against price distortions or lack of supply. The farm manager is a 
family member. The vertical integration solves the problem of uncertainty regarding quality and 
timing. Case A also sources from farms around the processing plant, buying on auctions market 
or through agents. There have been few attempts to establish quasi- integration or networks forms 
with its suppliers and none of them was successful. During an interview with one of the 
processor occasional supplier to raise the reasons of the failure, it was said “it is better to try to 
get some profit in each negotiation than to be tied by a long term contract”. However, the 
vertical integration gives a security to the processor that, if some opportunistic behaviour occurs 
among one of its supplier, it has an alternative option. It reduces his information costs in the 
long-term. Therefore, it increases the processor’s power in front of his suppliers. Thus, this 
processor uses the two extremes form of co-ordination: vertical integration and spot market.  
Concerning market information, Case A would like to know more about where its output is 
consumed. At present, the transaction is realised based on an inspector’s visit (representing the 
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importer) to the processing plant and monthly orders. This inspector checks the compliance with 
HACCP standards and the extrinsic and intrinsic cues of the final product (leanness, colour, 
package material, cut, marbling, etc). But there is no learning or knowledge transfer in this 
relationship.  Case A has developed its own export brand and has opened up an office in the 
European Union to learn more about this markets dynamics and to try to negotiate direct with 
supermarket chains. This step also overcomes the power the importer in holding market 
information. It considers that this alternative was only possible due to his vertical integration 
strategy. The compliance of product standard such as HACCP is not a problem. The new 
requirement for traceability has been already started on Case A farms.  
 
5.2.2 Case Study B 
The second case study is the third largest beef exporter in Brazil. The company slaughters 2,800 
heads per day at three different processing plants 70% of the total is exported. Besides supplying 
traditional beef, B also produces organic beef using  vertical integration to assure the compliance 
with standards. Organic beef has a 5-10% higher margin and opens up sophisticated markets 
abroad (UK, Germany, the Netherlands). To be able to export organic beef, the company 
detained an ISO 14000 (environmental standards) and is certified by a Brazilian Institute 
(Instituto Bio-Dinamico). However, Brazilian organic standards are not considered equivalent to 
the European standards. Imports had to recertify by certification bodies in the importing 
countries. In the farm, 3 000 hectares are certified as organic where 7 300 bulls are bred. The 
organic beef has to be economically feasible (as other production systems), socially just and 
ecologically produced only. Only homeopathic and phytotherapic products can be given to the 
livestock and the pastures cannot receive artificial pesticides or fertilizers. Conversion to organic 
production, therefore, takes time (in average, two years). 
The manager pointed out that if the organic market does not become as interesting as it promises, 
the company will still continue producing in the organic way. According to the Quality manager, 
this production system brings a change of mentality and value of waste, and ultimately reduces 
production costs in the long term. Both the fattening of the livestock and the productivity of the 
pasture is over average. So, the manager concludes, even if the margin does not  compensate for 
the investment made, changing for organic production system worth it.  
Additionally to the use of vertical integration to produce organic beef, spot markets are also 
taken advantage of. Case B argues that there is a lack of trust between farmer and producer to 
implement relationships such as contracts, networks and quasi- integration. But he also thinks 
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that this kind of behaviour is a barrier to the development of a real quality assurance scheme as 
required by importers. 
Case A and B are located in the Mato Grosso do Sul and are part of the horizontal alliance to 
promote the Brazilian beef in the international market.  
 
5.2.3 Cases Studies C and D 
The other two cases are located in the Southern Brazil and have some similar features. Compared 
to the first cases, are smaller beef processors (processing 350 and 600 heads per day, 
respectively) but with a good access to international market due to the breed of European 
livestock. However, they do not sell using their own brand and instead are trying to reach niches 
markets (such as hotels and restaurants). Both buy their inputs on the spot market, but C is 
starting to develop alliances with local farmers. Due to the non-adoption of traceability by all 
farmers, cases C and D face problems in sourcing inputs. Local farmers prefer to trade to 
merchants that pay cash resulting in high quality beef being sold to either to local butchers or 
street market instead of more value added market such as the EU one. The main reason being the 
absence of  premium price compensating for the extra effort required in implementing the 
standards. 
Cases C and D comply with the HACCP requirement, but according to C, it adds 20% to the 
fixed costs. 
5.4 CASE ANALYSIS 
Beef exporters use two forms of co-ordination: vertical integration and spot market. The largest 
exporters hold a backward vertical integration as security stock mainly to avoid price distortions 
or lack of supply. It also gives a security to the processor that, if some opportunistic behaviour 
occurs among one of its suppliers, he has an alternative option. Additionally, it compensates 
against lack of trust as well. Vertical integration reduces his information and negotiation costs in 
the long-term although increase his monitoring costs. Furthermore, it increases his bargain power 
with his suppliers because he is dependent on them just at a certain point in time. The flexibility 
of maintaining the steer/bull grazing for unlimited time is a specific feature of the beef chain. 
Livestock can be slaughter at any time with only slight increase of the production costs. Risk and 
perishability is transferred to the processing link.  
To reason why two cases adopt vertical integration and two cases do not, can be explained 
according to transaction features. The two cases where is an asset specificity (brand name and 
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organic ) motivated cases A and B to use a vertical integration. Cases C and D can find many 
potential input suppliers for which future demand is uncertain, it may be cheaper to buy the input 
than to make it internally. However, process standard such as traceability can be considered asset 
specificity since they are not yet uniformly implemented. The monitoring costs are also higher. 
Therefore, farmers and processors will have to use other forms of co-ordination such as networks 
and quasi- integration and change the transactions practices so far established. 
These four beef processors are well known exporters and invested in HACCP inside their 
companies. The two large companies are more willing to implement food safety a quality control 
systems, because they are a one-off expenditure and their large production easily justifies an 
investment of this scale. Now, however, they are under pressure by the EU regulation to develop 
a proper supply chain, moving from spot market to closer relationships. It is clear that this is 
not an easy move due to behavioural factors (existence of mistrust, opportunism, traditional 
practices) that prevent the use of network or quasi integration forms. The traceability emerges as 
the new international standard challenging beef processors.  
When the traceability requirements began, a beef exporter Quality manager foresaw that all beef 
processors would pay a market price for an animal with traceability and less for the one without 
it. This comment highlights that the establishment of standards is top-down encompassing the 
whole supply chain. For example, the importer requires the new standards and Brazilian 
companies have to follow them. Consequently, Brazilian beef processors demand traceable 
livestock and the farmer have to cover this requirement. There is no extra payment, just  
additional costs.  
The poor relationship creates losses to both links of the chain. For the beef processor, it brings a 
great uncertainty in finding the specific input at the right time (breed, age, traceable, among 
others). For the producer, there is an uncertainty of sales and prices. The adoption of vertical 
integration reduces this uncertainty but do not give flexibility to respond new situations and 
demands a high investment, not available for medium processors.  
6.CONCLUSIONS  
This paper has highlighted how Brazilian beef exporters are changing their practices in response 
to international standards, such as HACCP and traceability. Product standards such as HACCP 
are more easily implemented, however, process standard that involve supply chain management 
have not yet been successfully put into practice. Behavioural issues have to be overcome to 
allow changes in the transaction practices of spot markets. It is suggested that the formation of 
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networks and quasi integration strategies should be considered and the spread of market and 
technical information are necessary to the maintenance of the beef export chain competitiveness. 
On one hand, international standards are a qualifying factor in international trade but also act as 
non-tariff barriers. These standards squeeze small sized companies with no capacity to invest in 
out of the market. On the other hand, compliance with standards is demanding new forms of co-
ordination resulting in flexibility and information sharing. Organisational change would be 
considered as trading-up, the establishment of international strict standards bringing benefits to 
local environment. The new challenge for Brazilian exporters is the development of a trustable 
traceability scheme along the supply chain. So far, farmers are not investing in these schemes 
unless the beef processor covers/refunds these extra costs. Yet processors do not want to pay 
premium price and less so to the ones who do not supply according to the new requirements.   
An interesting finding is that horizontal alliances have been made between the largest beef 
processors improving access to the international market (Brazilian beef brand). This is an 
important initiative showing that processors could move from competition to co-operation 
aiming the same target. Nevertheless, there is still low co-operation and minimal trust exists 
between beef processors and their suppliers. The majority of transactions still happen through 
spot markets. Some preliminary alliances should begin, mainly with large and technological 
producers, to guarantee the supply. This will allow a concentration process to start on the 
farmers’ link, eliminating those with no traceability scheme from supplying large export 
companies. 
One probable effect of complying with international standards is that the monitoring 
(traceability) scheme requires sharing of information throughout the supply chain. Co-operative 
arrangements will help to monitor safety standards to beef exported. Fearne [16] described a 
similar process of closer co-ordination happened in the UK after the BSE crisis in order to 
recover consumer’s trust. After the natural structural adjustment, it brought a trading up as 
farmers participating actively in the chain receive market information and premium prices for 
their cattle. However, further research on the development of traceability scheme along beef 
supply chain and changes of co-ordination are recommended to confirm the issues pointed by 
this study. 
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